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THE RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED 
PERSONS ACT AND MEGA-CHURCHES: DEMONSTRATING 
THE LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS LAND USE EXEMPTIONS IN 
FEDERAL LEGISLATION. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, religious institutions and local governments have 
been interlocked in a charged debate over land use. 1 The conflict is 
the result of a convergence of several factors and it has culminated in 
local governments' implementing new regulations aimed at religious 
institutions' land use.2 Part of the conflict can be attributed to 
society's evolving attitude towards religion, in terms of its preferred 
style of worship and in its perception of religious land use. 3 
Religious institutions have also evolved and are increasingly using 
the land for secular purposes. 4 Burgeoning land use regulations are 
now a robust topic of debate among legal scholars and legislators, 
and tensions between religious institutions and government 
regulations is at an all time high. 5 On July 27, 2000, Congress 
stepped in and passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act ("RLUIPA").6 With RLUIPA, Congress intended to 
I. See, e.g., Marci Hamilton, Struggling with Churches as Neighbors, Findlaw's Writ 
(Jan. 17, 2002), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20020117 .html [hereinafter 
Hamilton, Struggling with Churches as Neighbors]; see also Alan C. Weinstein, 
Recent Developments Concerning RLU!PA, in CURRENT TRENDS AND PRACTICAL 
STRATEGIES IN LAND USE LAW AND ZONING 2 (Patricia Salkin ed., 2004) ("In the three 
years since RLUIPA was signed into law, churches in every section of the country 
have challenged zoning, historic preservation, and eminent domain decisions that they 
view as obstacles to how they develop or use their properties."). 
2. See infra Part V.B. 
3. See discussion infra Parts IV.A, V.B. 
4. See infra Part IV.B. 
5. See infra Part V.B; see also Christian Nolan, A Not-So-Simple Matter Of Faith, 
CoNN. L. TRIB., Oct. 19, 2009, at 1, 9 (2009) (noting the prevalence of RLUIPA 
litigation across the country). In Nolan's article, Patricia Salkin, Associate Dean, 
Professor of Law, and Director of the Government Law Center of Albany Law 
School, states "'(i]t seems that whenever a religious organization is denied a permit to 
build something or enlarge something, there is often a retort to the local government 
that we're going to sue you under RLUIP A."' /d. at l. 
6. 42 U.S. C. §§ 2000cc to -5 (2006). 
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ameliorate the effect of local land use regulations and widen the land 
use rights of religious institutions in land use conflicts. 7 
In the nine years since its enactment, the constitutionality and 
efficacy of RLUIPA's land use provisions have been debated 
extensively among supporters of the statute and a range of critics, 
which include state and local communities, prominent land use 
experts, and legal scholars. 8 Chief among the criticisms RLUIP A 
opponents advance are that additional First Amendment protection 
was unnecessary,9 that the federal statute intrudes into an area that 
has historically been regarded as a prerogative of local 
governments, 10 and that Congress expanded established free exercise 
standards in contravention of the Supreme Court ofthe United States' 
province and duty to "say what the law is."11 
This Comment uses the phenomenon of mega-churches as a vehicle 
to illustrate the common criticisms RLUIP A opponents have raised 
and to demonstrate the significant impact RLUIP A has had and has 
the potential to have on local land use regulations as well as on the 
communities coping with the impact of mega-churches. This 
Comment concludes that RLUIP A and similar federal legislation that 
applies broad First Amendment protection to all religious land use is 
ill equipped to address secular land use by religious institutions like 
mega-churches. 12 The substantial disconnect between the land use 
challenges that local governments currently face and the authority 
that they retain under RLUIP A compels the conclusion that RLUIP A 
is both impractical in application and unconstitutional. Locally 
developed land use regulations are better equipped to meet the 
demands of a developing religious society and account for all of the 
interests at stake when a land use dispute arises. 13 
Mega-churches exemplify a developing nuance in religion, and in 
tum, in religious land use. Mega-churches, typically defined as 
7. See An Internet Resource on the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
of2000, http://www.rluipa.cornlindex/php/topic/20.htrn (last visited Jan. 4, 2009); see 
also infra Part liLA. 
8. See infra Part Ill.B. 
9. See discussion infra Part Ill.B. 
lO See discussion infra Parts III.B, V. 
11. Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
U.S. 507, 536 (finding that Congress exceeded its authority under the Constitution) 
("When the political branches of the Government act against the background of a 
judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must be understood that in 
later cases and controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the respect due 
them under settled principles ... and contrary expectations must be disappointed."). 
12. See infra Part V.C. 
13 See infra Part VI. 
2010) Limits to Religious Land Use Exemptions 257 
Protestant, 14 have ushered in a new form of religious observance 
distinct from the style of observance commonly associated with a 
"traditional" church. 15 A mega-church is not only a house for 
services and prayer, but it is also a one-stop shop for congregants-
an all inclusive community where people can "eat, shop, go to school, 
bank, work out, scale a rock-climbing wall and pray ... all without 
leaving the grounds."16 Their secular amenities range from sports 
arenas and gymnasiums to day care centers and entire apartment 
complexes. 17 
Part church, part civic community, mega-churches function like 
small towns. They offer eighty plus activities daily and operate 
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. 18 Mega-churches have a 
sustained average weekly attendance of 2,000 or more persons19 and 
their popularity continues to grow. 20 
Mega-churches are also extremely profitable business ventures.21 
Mega-churches frequently partner with for profit companies like 
Sysco, McDonalds, and Subway, and they also sponsor credit unions, 
issue credit cards, and lend to small businesses.22 Mega-churches 
continue to add secular amenities to their repertoire as part of a well-
crafted mission to attract new congregants and to provide newcomers 
with a reason to keep coming back. 23 The business of mega-churches 
has become so profitable, that new businesses are being created for 
the sole purpose of helping churches become bigger and better. 24 
Entrepreneurs can now purchase books and attend seminars to learn 
how to successfully build a mega-church from the ground up. 25 
14. The Hartford Seminary and Institute for Religion Research, Megachurch Definition 
http://hirr.hartsem.edu/megachurch/definition.htrnl (last visited Jan. 5, 2009) 
[hereinafter Hartford Seminary]. 
15. See Hamilton, Struggling with Churches as Neighbors, supra note 1. 
16. Patricia Leigh Brown, Megachurches as Minitowns, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2002, at Fl. 
17. See id. 
18. See id. 
19. Hartford Seminary, supra note 14. 
20. See Brown, supra note 16. Brown argues that mega-churches prosper because they 
"reflect a broad cultural desire for rootedness and convenience for overextended 
families .... [and] offer relief from stresses on American family life." /d. 
21. See infra notes 184-91 and accompanying text. 
22. See Diana B. Henriques & Andrew W. Lehren, Megachurches Add Local Economy to 
Mission, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2007, at Al. 
23. See id. 
24. See infra note 191. 
25. See infra note 191. 
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The recent proliferation of mega-churches has garnered many 
followers, but not everyone is enthusiastic about having a mega-
church operating twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week in their 
backyard. The manifold adverse effects that the mammoth 
establishments impose on those who reside nearby have prompted 
justifiable concern among some communities.26 . Similar to large-
scale secular institutions, mega-churches increase traffic, noise, and 
pollution.27 Mega-church grounds also occupy many acres of 
valuable local land, hindering community ambitions for future 
development. 28 For those that are not a part of a mega-church's 
congregation, the church and its seemingly limitless amenities are 
viewed as burdensome and injurious to the harmony of the 
community. 29 
Negative community responses to mega-churches and the resulting 
friction are part of a broader conflict over local land use for religious 
purposes. Concerned over the negative effects of religious land use, 
local governments have increasingly sought to regulate religious 
institutions on par with secular institutions, and in some instances, 
have expanded regulations aimed at religious land use. 30 The 
increase in local land use regulation has in tum generated additional 
claims by religious institutions who view such regulations as an 
obstacle to their First Amendment right to build or expand for 
religious purposes.31 
In 2000, Congress responded to the claims of frustrated religious 
institutions and enacted RLUIP A. 32 RLUIP A regulates the 
relationship between religious institutions and local governments and 
communities by setting forth a general rule prohibiting local 
governments from enforcing or implementing land use regulations in 
a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise 
of a person or a group of persons.33 Local land use regulations and 
decisions are valid under RLUIP A only if the government is able to 
demonstrate that its imposition of the burden is in furtherance of a 
26. See Hamilton, Struggling with Churches as Neighbors, supra note l. 
27. See id. 
28. See id. 
29. See id. 
30. See infra Part V.B. 
31. See infra Part V .B. 
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to -5. Although RLUIPA addresses religious land use 
specifically, it should be noted that Congress has attempted to strengthen protections 
of religious conduct through broader legislation that preceded RLUIP A. See infra 
Part II. C. 
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(l). 
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compelling government interest and is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that interest. 34 Congress intended for the courts to construe 
RLUIP A broadly, in favor of heightened land use rights for religious 
institutions.35 Despite vocal opposition, RLUIP A remains in force 
today and it continues to provide a federal remedy to aggrieved 
religious land users. 36 The mounting friction between religious 
institutions and some communities however has galvanized calls for 
its invalidation. 37 
Part II of this Comment explores the development of the First 
Amendment standards utilized in RLUIP A, including those 
articulated by the Supreme Court38 and in federal legislation39 that 
preceded its enactment. The First Amendment standards developed 
prior to RLUIP A heavily influenced the terms Congress used and the 
scope of RLUIPA's application in the land use context. The First 
Amendment standards applied before RLUIP A also reflect the 
inherent tension between religion and government that has existed for 
centuries. 
Part III explains RLUIPA's land use provisions relevant to this 
Comment and distinguishes those provisions from previously 
established Free Exercise standards.40 This part also identifies and 
considers some of the common criticisms that opponents have 
articulated against RLUIPA.41 The following critiques proffered by 
RLUIP A opponents are the most likely to be corroborated or 
illustrated by the mega-church phenomenon: 
First, Congress has substantially undermined the traditional 
authority of local governments to develop and implement land use 
34. /d. §§ 2000cc(a)(1)(A)-(B). 
35. See 146 CONG. REc. S7774-S7775 (2000). 
36. The Supreme Court has yet to review the validity ofRLUIPA's land use provisions, 
but it did uphold the RLUIP A provision involving prisoners against an Establishment 
Clause challenge in the 2005 case of Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005). In 
Cutter, prisoners of an Ohio prison claimed that their rights were violated under 
RLUIP A when the prisoners were denied access to religious literature and the 
opportunity to conduct religious services. /d. at 712-13. The Court rejected the 
State's argument that the RLUIPA provision was unconstitutional under the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. /d. at 720. 
37. See infra Part III.B. 
38. See infra Part II.B. 
39. See infra Part II.C. 
40. See infra Parts liLA, III.C. 
41. See infra Part III.B. 
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regulations.42 RLUIPA's overly intrusive land use provisions are at 
odds with the Supreme Court's recognition that land use regulation is 
a means for communities to achieve "a satisfactory quality of life in 
both urban and rural communities. "43 
Second, RLUIP A unfairly elevates religious land use above land 
use by non-religious individuals and institutions, intimating 
prohibited government establishment of religion.44 The new and 
broadened terms in RLUIP A have far-reaching implications because 
they fail to distinguish between a church's religious and secular land 
use.45 Congress's failure to exclude secular amenities carried out by 
a religious institution from RLUIP A's definition of "religious 
exercise" increases the probability that mega-churches and similar 
religious institutions will be immunized against local land use 
regulation in the future. 
Part IV defines and discusses the common features of mega-
churches. This part emphasizes the prevalence of mega-churches and 
suggests that the rationale for their immense popularity lies in the 
expansive amenities made available to congregants-a feature 
notably absent from the traditional church model. 46 This part also 
establishes a basis for the central claim of this Comment, focusing on 
the conclusion that RLUIP A is ill suited to address new and 
unanticipated land use concerns, such as the rise in the number of 
mega-churches. Although mega-churches lie at the extreme, they do 
demonstrate that religious institutions are beginning to use the land in 
ways that are not inherently religious. The mega-church 
phenomenon serves as a harbinger of the religious land use issues 
that are certain to arise in the future. 
Parts V and VI demonstrate the significant impact RLUIP A has had 
on the regulatory authority of state and local governments. These 
parts explain how Congress has divested state and local governments 
of their sovereign right to regulate land use and experiment with 
42. See Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311,335-41 (2003) 
[hereinafter Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good]; see also infra Part V.A. 
43. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981). 
44. See Sara C. Galvan, Beyond Worship: The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act of 2000 and Religious Institutions' Auxiliary Uses, 24 YALE L. & PoL'Y 
REv. 207, 209 (2006); Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine 
and Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1810, 1846-47 (2004) ("A 
nationwide measure subjecting all laws to strict scrutiny provides a benefit to religion 
as an institutional actor, rather than to any specific religious practice locally observed. 
It treats religion as a class for favored treatment."); see also infra Parts III.B, V.C.4. 
45. See infra Part III.B. 
46. See Brown, supra note 20; see also infra Part IV.B. 
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different approaches to meet the changing needs of their 
communities.47 These parts also discuss why it is especially 
important to retain local authority to develop and implement land use 
regulations, in light of the proliferation of mega-churches and the 
potential increase in other religious institutions that operate amenities 
that are not inherently religious in nature.48 Finally, these parts 
suggest a solution that is practical, consonant with our tradition of 
deferring to local land use regulation, and that will more effectively 
achieve religious diversity in today' s society. 49 
The aim of this article is to demonstrate that RLUIP A is indeed 
unfair and ineffective in resolving land use disputes between 
religious institutions and state and local governments. State and local 
governments can and do effectively calibrate a fair balance between 
the First Amendment interests of religious institutions and the 
interests of the communities that are effected by religious land use 
exemptions. The flaws of RLUIP A, considered together with the 
rapid growth of mega-churches in the United States, should give 
pause to those assessing the continued necessity and constitutional 
soundness of RLUIP A. 
II. DECIPHERING THE MEANING OF THE FREE EXERCISE 
CLAUSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof. "50 These prohibitions embody two distinct and 
fundamental conceptions of religious liberty: the Establishment 
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. 51 The Religion Clauses of the 
First Amendment safeguard religious liberty in two ways: ftrst, the 
government may not use the coercive resources of the state to 
"establish" a favored religion or religions; second, the government 
cannot interfere with the free exercise of religion. 52 The Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporated these safeguards against the states. 53 
4 7. See infra Part V .A. 
48. See infra Part V.B-C. 
49. See infra Part VI. 
50. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
51. See id. 
52. See Schragger, supra note 44, at 1811-12. Also central to the First Amendment's 
protections is prevention against majority-imposed norms on minority religious belief 
or exercise. !d. 
53. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
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A. The Inherent Tension Resulting From the Intersection of 
Religion and Government 
[Vol. 39 
The coexistence of religious institutions and government 
institutions necessarily implicates the power of each to influence the 
other. The Founders were cognizant of this inherent tension and 
incorporated specific guarantees in the First Amendment to effectuate 
a compromise in religion-government relations.54 The First 
Amendment protects religious institutions and religious belief against 
government regulation in order to preserve religious autonomy, while 
forbidding direct government sponsorship of any one religious 
mission. 55 Although a compromise is inherent in the First 
Amendment, conflict over the extent of its protections has embroiled 
the Supreme Court and Congress in a protracted and sometimes bitter 
exchange. 
For decades, the two branches of government have struggled to 
resolve the myriad issues that result from the intersection of religion 
and government. This Comment will focus principally on the issues 
that arise when the intersection between religion and government 
results in a Free Exercise Clause challenge. For the most part, the 
discourse between the Supreme Court and Congress in this area has 
centered upon the extent to which government regulations burden the 
free exercise of religion and on what religious accommodations are 
necessary to ameliorate those burdens. 56 
The Supreme Court has defined the "exercise of religion" as 
involving "not only belief and profession but the performance of (or 
abstention from) physical acts: assembling with others for a worship 
service, participating in sacramental use of bread and wine, 
proselytizing, [and] abstaining from certain foods or certain modes of 
transportation."57 While this definition sheds some light on the 
54. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our 
Religious Order, 47 VILL. L. REv. 37, 38 (2002) (exploring the distinctive place of 
religious institutions in various legal contexts). 
55. !d. 
56. See, e.g., Employment Div. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (holding 
that the right of free exercise of religion does not relieve an individual of the 
obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability); Sherbert v. 
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402--03 (1963) (holding that any governmental act that 
significantly burdens religiously motivated conduct is presumptively unconstitutional 
and valid only where the state can establish a compelling government interest). 
57. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877; see also Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical 
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HAR.v. L. REV. 1409, 1451-52, 
1488-90 (1990) (discussing extensive evidence from the period of the founding that 
supports the conclusion that the Free Exercise Clause protects conduct as well as 
speech). 
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meaning of the Clause, it does not entirely reveal the extent to which 
the First Amendment protects the religious conduct of individuals 
and institutions. 
Recently, the Supreme Court and Congress have expressed 
divergent views over the proper standard of review of an alleged 
violation of the free exercise of religion. 58 The issue of whether strict 
scrutiny review is the appropriate standard of review has become 
increasingly relevant in recent years, as conflicts between religious 
institutions and local communities continue to rise in number and in 
magnitude. 59 Congress raised the stakes for everyone involved when 
it enacted RLUIPA in 2000.60 The federal statute provides specific 
protection to religious institutions that seek to build, buy, or rent land 
for religious purposes. 61 RLUIP A is now the primary means for 
resolving land use disputes between religious and government 
institutions. 62 
Many consider RLUIPA to be Congress's most recent retort in its 
exchange with the Supreme Court. 63 As such, RLUIP A builds on an 
already complex Free Exercise doctrine, underscoring the great 
potential that it may have in reshaping established First Amendment 
standards and in governing the relationship between religious and 
government institutions in the future. 
B. Religious Conduct and Laws of General Applicability in the 
Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court's Free Exercise doctrine has vacillated between 
interpretations of the Clause that favor religious institutions and those 
that favor government institutions. This fluidity can be attributed to 
the Court's attendant concern over deferring too greatly to either 
party.64 A too liberal reading of the Clause would relegate neutral 
58. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(l) 
(2006) (reinstating strict scrutiny review of free exercise cases in direct contravention 
of the Supreme Court's adoption ofrationa1 basis review). 
59. See infra Part V.B. 
60. See infra Part Ill. 
61. 146 CONG. REc. S7774 (2000). 
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. 
63. See generally Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good, supra note 42 (detailing the 
exchange between Congress and the Supreme Court leading up to the enactment of 
RLUIPA); see also supra notes 1, 5 (discussing the pervasiveness of RLUIPA 
litigation). 
64. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166--67 (1878) (describing the anar-
chical result of permitting every religious belief to be carried into practice in 
derogation oflaws that apply equally to every individual). 
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laws of general applicability to the whims of religion. A too narrow 
reading of the Clause would fail to adequately protect religious 
minorities against religious discrimination. The Court's subtle 
awareness of these possibilities is a recurring theme throughout the 
following cases, which demonstrate how the Court has calibrated a 
balance between the conduct of religious institutions and neutral laws 
of general applicability prior to RLUIP A. 
In the first major free exercise case, the Supreme Court rejected the 
suggestion that the Free Exercise Clause created exemptions from 
generally applicable laws. In 1878, in the case of Reynolds v. United 
States,65 the Court limited the scope of First Amendment protection 
by weighing conflicts between laws of general applicability and 
religious practices in favor of laws of general applicability.66 
Reynolds, the petitioner, challenged a federal statute that prohibited 
plural marriages, a practice he engaged in as a requirement of his 
religious faith and church. 67 Although the law required imprisonment 
of Reynolds for obeying a command of his religion, the Court upheld 
the law, reasoning that "[l]aws are made for the government of 
actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief 
and opinions, they may with practices."68 Following Reynolds, the 
courts generally interpreted the First Amendment to mean that 
65. 98 u.s. 145. 
66. !d. at 166. The Court reasoned that if it were to read the Free Exercise Clause 
otherwise, the Clause would excuse every practice that was contrary to a religious 
belief. !d. at 166-67. Eventually, the religious beliefs of individuals would become 
superior to the laws of the United States. !d. at 167. In a society where every 
individual were freed of their obligation to follow generally applicable laws, a 
"[g]overnment could exist only in name." !d. See also Garrett Epps, "You Have Been 
in Afghanistan": A Discourse on the Van Alstyne Method, 54 DuKE L.J. 1555, 1575 
(2005) [hereinafter Epps, You Have Been in Afghanistan], for a criticismofthe Court 
for "imagin[ing] the most extreme assertions of religious rites that could be advanced 
and refut[ing] them instead of the case actually in front of it." 
67. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 161. The Morrill Act was designed to outlaw Mormon 
polygamy. See Act of July I, 1862, ch. 126, § 1, 12 Stat. 501, 501 (1862) (repealed 
1910) (criminalizing the practice of polygamy); Epps, You Have Been in Afghanistan, 
supra note 66, at 1572. 
68. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166. According to the Court, polygamy was condemnable for 
two reasons. First, it was not a belief or "mere opinion." !d. at 164. Second, it was 
"in violation of social duties or subversive of good order." !d. ("Polygamy has always 
been odious among the northern and western nations of Europe, and, until the 
establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the life of 
Asiatic and of African people."). 
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religious practices must give way to neutral laws of general 
applicability. 69 
Beginning in 1963, the Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise 
Clause shifted in favor of religious conduct. In Sherbert v. Verner, 70 
the Court departed from Reynolds and adopted a strict scrutiny test 
for free exercise cases.71 Any government act that significantly 
burdened religiously motivated conduct was presumptively 
unconstitutional and government imposed burdens were valid only 
where the state could establish a compelling government interest. 72 
The emphasis of the free exercise test was no longer on the nature of 
the law, but instead focused on the impact that the challenged 
prohibition had on the religious individual.73 Thus, in Sherbert, the 
Court invalidated a South Carolina law that denied unemployment 
benefits to the petitioner because she refused to work on Saturday, a 
practice consistent with her religious beliefs as a Seventh-day 
Adventist. 74 The Court held that South Carolina had no compelling 
interest in recognizing secular but not religious excuses for failure to 
work when determining eligibility for unemployment benefits.75 
Following Sherbert, the Court employed a strict scrutiny test in free 
exercise cases, balancing religious beliefs and generally applicable 
laws to determine whether to apply an exemption to a specific 
69. During this period, some religious minorities did win exemptions from neutral and 
generally applicable statutes, but most cases involved a free speech or due process 
claim applicable to all individuals, in addition to a religious claim. See, e.g., W.Va. 
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 643-44 (1943) (finding that the State of 
West Virginia could not constitutionally compel schoolchildren in public schools to 
salute the flag); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,311 (1940) (finding that the 
State of Connecticut could not constitutionally restrict a group of Jehovah's Witnesses 
from distributing religious materials by traveling door-to-door); Pierce v. Soc'y of 
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) ("The fundamental ... liberty upon which all 
governments ... repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its 
children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only."). 
70. 374 u.s. 398 (1963). 
71. !d. at 403-08. 
72. !d. at 406-08. The Court derived this balancing test from its prior cases resolving free 
speech challenges. See id. 
73. See id. at 403-04. 
74. !d. at 399-402. The Court held that the South Carolina law was invalid because 
it forced Sherbert "to choose between following the precepts of her religion and 
forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her 
religion in order to accept work, on the other hand." !d. at 404. 
75. !d. at 408-09. 
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individual's conduct. 76 The individual claiming the exemption had to 
demonstrate that the generally applicable law imposed a burden on 
his or her practice of religion and the state had to demonstrate that 
granting an exemption would interfere with a compelling state 
interest. 77 
In 1990, in Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith,78 the Court 
abandoned the strict scrutiny test and held that Sherbert had no 
application outside of the unemployment compensation field. 79 In the 
place of strict scrutiny, the Court returned to its holding in 
Reynolds. 80 Emphasizing that the Free Exercise Clause does not 
excuse compliance with neutral and generally applicable laws, the 
Court applied rational basis review to find that the State of Oregon 
was permitted to prohibit the sacramental use of peyote by Native 
American individuals under a neutral and generally applicable 
criminal statute. 81 
The Smith decision jettisoned virtually all of the principles 
promulgated by the Court only twenty-seven years earlier, prompting 
a wave of backlash against the Court. 82 Critics immediately attacked 
76. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141, 146 (1987); 
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. 
Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707,718 (1981). 
77. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403-08; see also Claire McCusker, Comment, When Church 
and State Collide: Averting Democratic Disaffection in a Post-Smith World, 25 YALE 
L. & PoL'Y REv. 391, 394 (2007) (citing Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403). Some critics note 
that while Sherbert's strict scrutiny test theoretically should have allowed for more 
exemptions for religious minorities than the standard in Reynolds, in practice very few 
exemptions were granted between 1963 and 1989. See id. at 394 (citing I KENT 
GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS 30 
(2006)). 
78. 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993). 
79. /d. at 884-85. 
80. See id. at 878-79. The Court stated that, "the right of free exercise does not relieve an 
individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general 
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his 
religion prescribes (or proscribes)."' /d. at 879 (quoting Lee, 455, U.S. at 263 n.3 
(Stevens, J., concurring)). 
81. /d. at 878-79, 882 (upholding the application of the statute to Native Americans 
discharged and denied unemployment benefits). 
82. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REv. I, 4, 
10-39 (arguing that courts' deferral to facially neutral laws restricting religion creates 
a "legal framework for persecution"); Ira C. Lupu, Employment Division v. Smith 
and the Decline of Supreme Court-Centrism, 1993 BYU L. REv. 259, 260 (1993) 
(claiming that Smith was "substantively wrong and institutionally irresponsible"); 
Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. 
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the Court's apparent disregard of Sherbert and its curtailment of 
established First Amendment protections. 83 Indeed, Smith did once 
again tip the scale in favor of neutral and generally applicable laws. 84 
Moreover, the Court removed the authority of the courts to 
accommodate religious beliefs and practices altogether, reasoning 
that exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability were more 
appropriately worked out through the political process. 85 
C. Congress Rebuffs Smith with the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act ("RFRA ')86 
Given the public shock and outrage following the Smith decision, 87 
it is no surprise that Congress increasingly became a key player in 
redeeming free exercise rights. 88 Critics' claims that Smith stripped 
away crucial protections and subverted well-settled First Amendment 
standards resonated with Congress, 89 and in response to the Court's 
decision, Congress enacted RFRA. 90 The purpose of RFRA was to 
restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert and 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 91 a Sherbert-era case.92 Congress relied on its 
power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
CHI. L. REv. 1109, 1111 (1990) (stating that "Smith is contrary to the deep logic of the 
First Amendment"). 
83. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Court is Urged to Rehear Case on Ritual Drugs, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 11, 1990, at Al6 (stating that fifty-five constitutional scholars and a 
diverse array of religious groups petitioned for a rehearing of the case). 
84. See Laycock, supra note 82, at 11-13. 
85. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 ("Just as a society that believes in the negative protection 
accorded to the press by the First Amendment is likely to enact laws that affirmatively 
foster the dissemination of the printed word, so also a society that believes in the 
negative protection accorded to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of that 
value in its legislation as well."); see also Garrett Epps, The Wrong Vampire, 21 
CARDOZO L. REv. 455, 464 (1999) [hereinafter Epps, The Wrong Vampire] (stating 
that the Smith decision referred the claims of religious minorities to the political 
process because the courts were ill-equipped to weigh them). 
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp. 1993). 
87. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text. 
88. See Epps, The Wrong Vampire, supra note 85, at 465. 
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a). "[L]aws 'neutral' toward religion may burden religious 
exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise." Id. § 
2000bb(a)(2). 
90. See 42 U.S. C. § 2000bb(a). 
91. 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (holding that the First Amendment and Fourteenth 
Amendment prevent a state from compelling Amish parents to enroll their children in 
formal high school to age sixteen). 
92. 42 u.s.c. § 2000bb(b)(l). 
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permits it to enforce the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment and impose RFRA's requirements on the states.93 
The central feature of RFRA was that it was remedial. RFRA 
provided all religious individuals and institutions with a claim or 
defense when the government (state or federal) substantially 
burdened their religious exercise.94 Most notably, RFRA departed 
from the holding in Smith by creating a statutory prohibition against 
government action substantially burdening the exercise of religion, 
even if the burden resulted from a law of general application.95 
Touting its impassioned name, Congress held RFRA out as 
necessary to reinstate "[m]eaningful constitutional protection[s]."96 
Based on committee hearing findings of constitutional abuses 
throughout the United States,97 Congress concluded that the strict 
scrutiny test applied in Sherbert was still a workable test for striking 
sensible balances between religious liberty and competing 
government interests.98 Congress also found that the political process 
was an inappropriate forum for preserving religious protections 
because the political process tended to favor majorities and because 
93. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that no state shall "deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, § I. Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "Congress shall 
have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions [of the Fourteenth 
Amendment)." !d. § 5. Section Five gives Congress "the same broad powers 
expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause" with respect to state governments and 
their subdivisions. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966). 
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(2). 
95. RFRA provided that the "[g]overnment may substantially burden a person's exercise 
ofreligion only if it demonstrates that application ofthe burden to the person-(1) is 
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive 
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-
1(b). 
96. SeeS. REP. No. 103-111, at 4-5 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1893-
94. At the committee hearings, Reverend Oliver S. Thomas, appearing on behalf of 
the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs and the American Jewish Committee, 
testified that "[s)ince Smith was decided, governments throughout the [United States] 
have run roughshod over religion" and warned that "[i]n time, every religion ... will 
suffer." !d. at 8, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1897. Examples of religious 
conviction included churches being zoned out of commercial areas and Jews being 
subjected to autopsies in violation of their families' faith. !d. 
97. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearing on H.R. 2797 
Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 102d Cong., 327-28 (1992) (statement of Douglas Laycock, Law 
Professor, University of Texas); see also Yang v. Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558 (D.R.I. 
1990) (reversing an earlier decision upholding Hmong Religious objections to an 
autopsy, in light of Smith). 
98. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5). 
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state and local legislators were unreliable when it came to crafting 
individual exemptions from laws of general applicability.99 
Only four years later, however, it became evident that Congress's 
enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment was not 
enough to sustain the broad protections of RFRA. In 1997, in City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 100 the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality 
of RFRA and invalidated the Act as it applied to the states. 101 The 
City of Boerne case was as good a case as any to challenge the 
constitutionality of RFRA, as it presented a classic conflict between a 
religious institution and a law of general application. 102 
In City of Boerne, the petitioner, Archbishop of San Antonio, relied 
upon RFRA as one basis of relief in seeking strict scrutiny review of 
a local zoning board's denial of its construction permit to enlarge its 
building. 103 The local zoning board denied St. Peter Catholic 
Church's permit based on a local historic preservation ordinance, 
which governed any construction affecting historical landmarks. 104 A 
conflict ensued between the local zoning board and the church, the 
local zoning board claimed that the church was designated as a 
historic district, and St. Peter countered that the construction was 
necessary to accommodate its growing parish. 105 
The Court resolved the conflict by invalidating RFRA, concluding 
that its far-reaching provisions exceeded Congress's authority under 
Section Five ofthe Fourteenth Amendment. 106 Although Congress is 
permitted to enact remedial and preventative legislation under 
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is prohibited from 
enacting legislation that is substantive in nature. 107 The Court held 
that RFRA was substantive in nature because it created new First 
Amendment rights for religious individuals and institutions. 108 In 
99. S. REP. No. 103-111, at 8 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1897. 
Congress found that because the political process tended to favor majorities, it 
provided inadequate protection for minority religious individuals and institutions. I d. 
100. 521 U.S. 507 (1997), superseded by statute, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to -5 (2006)). 
101. See id. at 535-36. 
I 02. The ordinance at issue authorized the City's Historick Landmark Commission to 




106. /d. at 536. 
107. /d. at 508. 
108. See id. at 532; see also supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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addition, the Court held that the RFRA provisions as applied to the 
states were unconstitutional because its broad prov1s1ons 
unnecessarily curtailed the authority of the states to regulate for the 
health and welfare of their citizens. 109 
III. RFRA REVISITED: THE RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND 
INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT OF 2000110 
Not long after City of Boerne, Congress countered with RLUIP A. 
Heeding the Court's exhortations regarding the constitutional 
soundness of RFRA, Congress held nine hearings over three years to 
address the extent of religious discrimination in the United States, 
and also Congress's authority to enact counteractive legislation. 111 
Congress passed RLUIP A on July 27, 2000, and President Clinton 
signed the Act on September 22, 2000. 112 
109. Id. at 533-35 ("The substantial costs RFRA exacts, both in practical terms of 
imposing a heavy litigation burden on the States and in terms of curtailing their 
traditional general regulatory power, far exceed any pattern or practice of 
unconstitutional conduct .... "). RFRA is still applicable against the federal 
government. See, e.g., Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 
546 U.S. 418,438 (2006) (holding that the government failed to demonstrate a 
compelling interest in barring a religious sect's sacramental use of hoasca, a 
hallucinogenic tea imported from the Amazon Rainforest). 
110. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to -5 (2006). 
Ill. See, e.g., Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. I 
(1997) (statement of Rep. Canady, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on the Constitution) 
("Because the freedom to practice one's religion is a fundamental right, we are 
meeting this morning in the wake of Boerne to consider what sources of authority 
Congress may utilize to protect this most precious freedom from governmental 
infringement."); Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores (Part II): 
Hearing Before Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
I 05th Cong. I (1998); Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores (Part JJI): 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
105th Cong. I (1998); Congress' Constitutional Role in Protecting Religious Liberty: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, I 05th Cong. 1-2 (1997); Religious 
Liberty: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, l06th Cong. 2 (1999); 
Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. 
on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 1-2 (1999); 
Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearing on S. 2148 Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 1 05th Con g. I ( 1998); Religious Liberty Protection Act of 
1998: Hearing on H.R. 4019 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. I (1998); see also Roman P. Storzer & Anthony 
R. Picarello, Jr., The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: A 
Constitutional Response to Unconstitutional Zoning Practices, 9 GEO. MASON L. REv. 
929, 985 (200 I). 
112. An Internet Resource on the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 
2000, http://www.rluipa.com/index.php/topic/20.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2009). The 
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A. Congress Distinguishes RLUIPA From Its Predecessor 
Careful to avoid the constitutional infirmities that plagued RFRA, 
Congress designed RLUIP A to provide increased protection for the 
free exercise of religion, but narrowed its application. 113 RLUIP A 
targets two contexts: land use regulation, and persons in prisons, 
mental hospitals, nursing homes and similar state institutions. 114 
Congress reinstated strict scrutiny review of free exercise challenges 
in land use and state institutions, because Congress determined that 
free exercise rights of vulnerable and minority groups were 
frequently infringed in these two areas. 115 
The section on land use applies in any case in which a "substantial 
burden is imposed in the implementation of a land use regulation or 
system of land use regulations, under which a government makes, or 
has in place formal or informal procedures or practices that permit 
the government to make, individualized assessments of the proposed 
uses for the property involved."116 A land use regulation is defined as 
"a zoning or landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that 
limits or restricts a claimant's use or development ofland."117 
Congress traced the "individualized assessment" language in the 
land use section from the Court's decisions in Sherbert and Smith and 
concluded that strict scrutiny review was appropriate because "[l]aws 
that provide for individualized assessments . . . are not generally 
applicable."118 Ever mindful of the Court's warnings in City of 
Boerne, Congress used this language to remain closely tethered to the 
Court's current interpretation of the First Amendment and, 
language and legislative history of RLUIP A is drawn largely from the Religious 
Liberty Protection Acts of 1998 and 1999 (RLP A), which Congress introduced to 
reenact RFRA through the Commerce and Spending Clauses. See 146 CoNG. REc. 
El563 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2000) (statement of Rep. Canady). RLPA failed because of 
strong opposition of lobbyists, however certain members of Congress did not cease in 
their efforts to pass particular elements of the bill. See Hamilton, Federalism and the 
Public Good, supra note 42, at 334-35. Congress enacted RLUIPA despite the fact 
that it did not hold a single hearing addressing the Act's land use provisions. ld. 
113. 146 CoNG. REc. S7774, S7774 (2000). 
114. Jd. 
115. See 146 CoNG. REc. H7191 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (statement of Rep. Canady). 
116. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C) (2006). 
117. Id. § 2000cc-5(5). 
118. 146 CoNG. REc. E1563 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2000) (statement of Rep. Canady). 
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accordingly, how much protection is afforded to religious individuals 
and institutions under the Free Exercise Clause. 119 
Congress also compiled "massive evidence" that the right to build 
for religious purposes was frequently violated because of the high 
level of discretion that local officials have in zoning processes. 120 
The legislative record preceding RLUIP A included several anecdotal 
examples of local zoning boards across the country denying land use 
rights to new, small, or unfamiliar churches. 121 Congress generally 
categorized local zoning boards' reasons for denying land use 
rights-traffic, noise, and aesthetics-as mere pretexts for 
discrimination. 122 
In addition to developing a more extensive legislative record than 
in the case of RFRA, Congress further distinguished RLUIP A in two 
other important ways. First, Congress added two jurisdictional 
prongs; Congress limited RLUIPA's enforcement to cases where 
Congress has power under the Commerce Clause and the Spending 
Clause, in addition to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 123 
Second, Congress purported to track and codify the legal standards 
established by the Supreme Court rather than create new ones. 124 
Congress intentionally excluded a new definition of the decisive term 
"substantial burden" and directed courts applying RLUIP A to 
interpret the term "by reference to Supreme Courtjurisprudence."125 
Nevertheless, RLUIP A remains substantially similar to RFRA in its 
standard, scope of application, and overall purpose. RLUIP A 
119. Congress concluded that "[the] factual record is itself sufficient to support prophy-
lactic rules to simplify the enforcement of constitutional standards in land use 
regulation of churches." 146 CONG. REc. S7774, S7775 (2000) (emphasis added). 
120. /d.; see also 146 CONG. REc. El234, El235 (daily ed. July 14, 2000) (statement of 
Rep. Canady) ("[RLUIPA's land use provisions] are designed to remedy the well-
documented discriminatory and abusive treatment suffered by religious individuals 
and organizations in the land use context."); Faith Temple Church v. Town of 
Brighton, 405 F. Supp. 2d 250, 255 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) ("The legislative history 
indicates that Congress was concerned about local governments' use of their zoning 
authority to discriminate against religious groups by making it difficult or impossible 
for them to build places of worship or other facilities .... "). 
121. 146 CONG. REc. S7774, S7774-S7775; see also Douglas Laycock, State RFRAs and 
Land Use Regulation, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 755, 769-83 (1999) (summarizing the 
evidence that Congress relied upon in passing RLUIP A). 
122. 146 CONG. REc. S7774, S7774. 
123. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a) (2006); 146 CONG. REc. S7774, S7775. 
124. 146 CONG. REc. S7774, S7775. Congress claimed that RLUIPA satisfied 
constitutional standards because it merely codified the legal standards in one or more 
Supreme Court opinions for "greater visibility and easier enforceability." /d. 
125. !d. at S7776. 
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requires strict scrutiny review of government actions, 126 and as 
discussed in the following sections, RLUIPA's scope of application is 
broad in the land use context. 127 RLUIP A's purpose is also redolent 
of RFRA; Congress reinstated strict scrutiny review in RLUIP A in 
order to compel regulators to "more fully justify substantial burdens 
on religious exercise."128 
Moreover, RLUIPA's imposing mandates are commensurate to the 
comprehensive restrictions that RFRA imposed on the states and 
which the Supreme Court found unconstitutional in City of Boerne. 129 
The similarities between RLUIP A and RFRA, considered in context 
with Congress's instruction to the courts to broadly apply RLUIPA to 
maximize religious protection, tend to indicate that Congress 
intended for RLUIP A to serve the same end goal as RFRA: to effect 
a substantive change in First Amendment protections. 130 
B. An Outpouring of RLUIPA Opposition 
Although RLUIP A is a "recalibrated" version of RFRA, it 
continues to receive considerable criticism from many opponents of 
the Act who claim that RLUIPA is unnecessary, unbalanced in favor 
of religious land use, overly vague, and unconstitutional. 131 RLUIP A 
opponents advance several arguments in support of its invalidation. 
126. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(l). 
127. See infra Part III.B-C. 
128. 146 CoNG. REc. S7774, S7775 (joint statement of Senators Hatch and Kennedy). 
129. In fact, Senator Hatch, co-sponsor of RFRA and RLUIPA, conceded that he would 
have "preferred a broader bill" than the one that was passed in 2000. 146 CONG. REc. 
S7774, S7774. 
130. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g). Despite language in the statute instructing the courts to 
construe the statute as a whole broadly, Congress ostensibly did not intend for the 
terms "religious exercise" and "substantial burden" to be given any broader 
interpretation than the Supreme Court's articulation of the two concepts. 146 CoNG. 
REc. S7774, S7776. 
131. For arguments that RLUIP A is constitutional, see, for example, Storzer & Picarello, 
supra note 111; Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Judicial Review of Local Land Use 
Decisions: Lessons From RLU/PA, 31 HAR.v. J. L. & PUB. PoL'Y 717 (2008); Matthew 
D. Krueger, Note, Respecting Religious Liberty: Why RLUIPA Does Not Violate the 
Establishment Clause, 89 MINN. L. REv. 1179 (2005). For arguments that RLUIPA is 
unconstitutional, see, for example, Federalism and the Public Good, supra note 42; 
Julie M. Osborn, RLUIPA 's Land Use Provisions: Congress' Unconstitutional 
Response to City of Boerne, 28 U.C. DAVIS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 155 (2004); Joshua 
R. Geller, Note, The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: 
An Unconstitutional Exercise of Congress's Power Under Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 561 (2002/2003). 
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The degree to which frequent free exercise violations actually 
occur in the land use context has been hotly contested. 132 The 
primary study, conducted by Brigham Young University, relied upon 
by proponents of RLUIP A, has been widely criticized for being 
misleading, marred with discrepancies, and for using cases that are 
more than forty years old (a notable critique the Court made 
regarding the evidence Congress presented in support of RFRA). 133 
In addition, more current studies tend to disprove claims of 
widespread discrimination and demonstrate that, in fact, religious 
institutions seeking permission to use land face little to no barriers 
above and beyond the standard barriers faced by all land users. 134 
To further undermine the primary assumption of RLUIP A-that a 
federal remedy was necessary-RLUIP A opponents emphasize that 
not even Congress could defmitively assert that discrimination 
against religious land use "occur[ s] in every jurisdiction with land use 
authority."135 Some members of Congress felt that there was 
insufficient evidence of land use discrimination to "justify making 
every federal, state and local land use decision and regulation 
vulnerable to attack."136 
A lack of substantial evidence that there is widespread 
discrimination in land use decisions buttresses opponents' demands 
that Congress retreat from an area traditionally reserved to state and 
132. See, e.g., Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good, supra note 42, at 345-52; Ada-
Marie Walsh, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: 
Unconstitutional and Unnecessary, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 189 (2001); 
Caroline R. Adams, Note, The Constitutional Validity of the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: Will RLUIPA 'S Strict Scrutiny Survive the 
Supreme Court's Strict Scrutiny?, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 2361 (2002). 
133. See Adams, supra note 132, at 2397-400; see also Hamilton, Federalism and the 
Public Good, supra note 42, at 347 (citing, among other weaknesses of the Brigham 
Young study, that it asserts a general, unsupported claim that churches are treated less 
well than other uses). 
134. See, e.g., Stephen Clowney, An Empirical Look at Churches in the Zoning Process, 
116 YALE L.J. 859, 868 (2007) (concluding that, in the context of zoning exemptions, 
churches are treated no differently than secular applicants and that no disparity exists 
between the treatment of minority and mainstream denominations). In another 
frequently cited study, empirical results indicated that "[t]he nearly universal 
experience of American congregations seeking government authorization to do 
something they want to do is one of facilitation rather than roadblock." Mark Chaves 
& William Tsitsos, Are Congregations Constrained by Government? Empirical 
Results from the Federal Congregations Study, 42 J. CHURCH & ST. 335, 341 (2000). 
135. 146 CONG. REc. S7774, S7775 (2000). 
136. H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 37 (1999). 
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local governments. 137 If current studies indicate that state and local 
governments can and have fairly balanced the interests of religious 
institutions against those of the community, then there is no 
justification for usurping local policy and norms in favor of a federal 
remedy. 
Another consequence of providing a federal remedy when there is 
no demonstrated need for one is that it raises additional First 
Amendment Establishment Clause concerns. This heightened 
potential for constitutional violations is exacerbated by the broadened 
and vague terms used in RLUIP A, which foster considerable room 
for judicial interpretation in favor of religious individuals and 
institutions seeking to overturn unfavorable local land use 
regulations. 
C. Congress Redefined and Broadened "Religious Exercise" 
RLUIP A provides a religious institution with a claim when 
government action substantially burdens its religious exercise. 138 The 
application of RLUIP A and its heightened standard of review is 
heavily dependent on the Act's definition of the term "religious 
exercise" because if a religious institution cannot demonstrate that a 
particular land use policy affects their exercise of religion, then the 
institution cannot establish a claim under RLUIP A. 
RLUIP A defines "religious exercise" as "any exercise of religion, 
whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious 
belief."139 This definition includes the building or conversion of real 
property if the person or entity that uses or intends to use the property 
does so for that purpose. 140 
Not every religious activity constitutes a "religious exercise," but 
the provisions of RLUIP A fail to exclude tangential amenities from 
the Act's definition of the term. 141 Taken to its logical extreme, the 
137. Cheryl L. Runyon, Kelly Anders, & Susan Parnas Frederick, Religious Land Use-
State and Federal Legislation, 25 N.C.S.L. ST. LEGISL. REP. 14 (2000), available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/natres/SLR2514.htm.; see also supra note 43; 
discussion infra Part V.A. 
138. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a) (2006). 
139. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). By contrast, the definition of religious exercise in RFRA 
was arguably less broad. RFRA defined religious exercise as the "exercise of religion 
under the First Amendment to the Constitution." Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 5, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993). 
140. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(B). 
141. See 146 CoNG. REc. S7774, S7776 ("In many cases, real property is used by religious 
institutions for purposes that are comparable to those carried out by other institutions. 
276 Baltimore Law Review (Vol. 39 
language of RLUIP A allows a religious institution to avoid having to 
comply with local zoning regulations that would otherwise apply to 
its activities or facilities that are unrelated to its beliefs or mission, or 
that would apply to a non-religious institution offering the same 
amenities. 142 
Moreover, this definition is far broader than the definition of 
religious exercise that the Supreme Court has previously articulated. 
In prior cases, the Supreme Court has defined religious exercise as 
"the observation of a central belief or practice,"143 and as behavior 
and beliefs compelled by a particular religion. 144 The Supreme Court 
and lower courts have used these definitions in order to closely 
examine whether there was a connection between the religious 
institution's conduct and the religious belief at issue. 145 In contrast to 
this line of case law, RLUIP A lacks any requirement that a party 
demonstrate the significance of their conduct before the court 
imposes the high burden on the state to demonstrate that the 
regulation serves a compelling government interest. 146 
In addition to establishing that their conduct is a religious exercise 
as defined under RLUIP A, a party must also demonstrate that the 
regulation at issue imposes a substantial burden on their free exercise 
of religion. 147 If a party fails to meet their burden of proof, their 
action cannot proceed. 148 Fortunately for religious institutions, 
RLUIPA's broadening of the definition of religious exercise all but 
guarantees that most religious institutions will proceed to the issue of 
While recognizing that these activities or facilities may be owned, sponsored or 
operated by a religious institution, or may permit a religious institution to obtain 
additional funds to further its religious activities, this alone does not automatically 
bring these activities or facilities within the bill's definition or 'religious exercise."'). 
142. See Daniel P. Lennington, Thou Shalt Not Zone: The Overbroad Applications and 
Troubling Implications ofRLUJPA 's Land Use Provisions, 29 SEA TILE U. L. REv. 
805, 834 (2006). 
143. Hernandez v. Commr, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989). 
144. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981); 
see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (defining religious exercise as 
adherence to the central precepts of a religion). 
145. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403-04. 
146. The troubling implication of RLUIPA's new and broadened terminology is already 
playing out in the courts charged with applying the federal statute. The Seventh 
Circuit surmised that it was "Congress's intent to expand the concept of religious 
exercise [as it was used] both in decisions discussing the precursory RFRA ... and in 
traditional First Amendment jurisprudence." Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. 
City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted) [hereinafter 
C.L.U.B.]. 
147. See42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(l){2006). 
148. C.L.U.B., 342 F.3d at 760. 
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whether a land use regulation imposes a substantial burden on its 
conduct. 
This potential increase in facilitated access to the courts for 
religious institutions only underscores another equally troubling 
implication of RLUIP A's broad scope. When Congress drafted 
RLUIP A, it opted not to define the term substantial burden and 
instead directed the courts to apply RLUIP A with reference to the 
Supreme Court's previous articulations ofthe term. 149 This, however, 
only invites further confusion and room for judicial interpretation 
because even the Supreme Court has avoided conclusively defining 
substantial burden, emphasizing that the analysis of its existence is 
fact specific. 150 
Thus, it is no surprise that there is a split among the courts as to 
what exactly constitutes a substantial burden on religious conduct 
under RLUIP A. 151 Some courts have endeavored to fashion a 
workable definition of the term in order to avoid immunizing 
religious individuals and institutions against land use regulations, 152 
149. 146 CONG. REc. S7774, S7776 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Senators 
Hatch and Kennedy). 
150. Living Water Church of God v. Charter Twp. of Meridian, 258 Fed. App'x 729,733-
34 (6th Cir. 2007) ("In the 'Free Exercise' context, the Supreme Court has made clear 
that the 'substantial burden' hurdle is high and that determining its existence is fact 
intensive."). 
151. See Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, The Genesis of RLU/PA and Federalism: 
Evaluating the Creation of a Federal Statutory Right and Its Impact on Local 
Government, 40 URB. LAW. 195, 226, app. at 259--67 (2008) (summarizing the various 
formulations of the meaning of substantial burden). 
152. See, e.g., Westchester Day Sch. v. Viii. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 348-49 (2d 
Cir. 2007) (holding that the proper inquiry is whether the government act "directly 
coerces the religious institution to change its behavior"); Guru Nanak Sikh Soc'y of 
Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2006) ("'[F]or a land use 
regulation to impose a "substantial burden," it must be "oppressive" to a "significantly 
great" extent."' (quoting San Jose Christian Coli. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 
1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004))) (alteration in original); Grace United Methodist Church 
v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 661--62 (lOth Cir. 2006) ("[T]he incidental effects 
of otherwise lawful government programs 'which may make it more difficult to 
practice certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting 
contrary to their religious beliefs' do not constitute substantial burdens on the exercise 
of religion." (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 
450-51 (1998))); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 
(lith Cir. 2004) ("[A] 'substantial burden' must place more than an inconvenience on 
religious exercise; a 'substantial burden' is akin to significant pressure which directly 
coerces the religious adherent to conform his or her behavior accordingly."). 
278 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 39 
while other courts have abstained from fmnly adopting any one 
definition. 153 
In Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 154 the 
Seventh Circuit, faced with a RLUIP A claim, was compelled to 
narrow its previous definition of substantial burden to avoid 
establishing a precedent that would immunize religious institutions 
against almost all land use regulations. 155 If the court were to apply 
both RLUIPA's broadened definition of religious exercise and its 
previous definition of substantial burden, it would transform minor, 
incidental burdens into a substantial burden. 156 The slightest 
obstacles to land use would be enough to trigger RLUIP A's 
requirement that the government regulation pass under strict scrutiny 
review. 157 Essentially, RLUIP A "render[ ed] meaningless the word 
substantial." 158 
Practically speaking, if the court had not modified its previous 
definition of the term substantial burden, then religious institutions 
would be immunized against land use regulations, which imposed 
only an incidental burden on the free exercise of religion. 159 Though 
the Seventh Circuit avoided this result in C.L. U.B., 160 the climate 
created by RLUIP A is ripe for another court to find otherwise. In 
153. See, e.g., Mintz v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 424 F. Supp. 2d 309, 319-22 (D. Mass. 
2006) (citing the definitions contained in Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit 
decisions but not specifically adopting a particular formulation). 
154 342 F.2d 752 (7th Cir. 2003). 
155. Id. at 761. The Seventh Circuit now defines the term "substantial burden" under 
RLUIP A as "one that necessarily bears direct, primary, and fundamental 
responsibility for rendering religious exercise ... effectively impracticable." Jd. 
(emphasis added). 
156. See id. 
157. See id. 
158. Jd. 
159. See id. 
160. Only two years later, the Seventh Circuit appeared to retreat from C.L.U.B. in Saints 
Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d 
895 (7th Cir. 2005), when it applied a broader defmition of the term substantial 
burden, holding that a local zoning board imposed a substantial burden when it denied 
a religious organization's zoning permit, which would require rezoning a residential 
zone to allow for religious uses. /d. at 901. For the court, having to restart the permit 
process constituted a substantial burden, in part because it would cause delay, 
uncertainty, and expense. I d. at 90~ 1. The court held this despite the fact that 
earlier case law, including the C.L. U.B. decision, indicated that delay, inconvenience, 
and expense did not amount to a substantial burden. C.L.U.B., 342 F.3d at 761 
(emphasis added). Several years later, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its definition of 
the term substantial burden applied in C.L.U.B., clarifying that the City of New Berlin 
decision did nothing to modify the earlier defmition. See Vision Church v. Village of 
Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 997 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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fact, greater immunization of religious land use is not entirely 
unforeseeable if the courts read the provisions of RLUIP A with 
Congress's instruction to construe the federal statute in favor of a 
broad free exercise protection in mind. 161 
In sum, not only has RLUIP A obscured the role of the courts, 
inviting them to interpret far more than is prudent in terms of 
consistency and fairness to other interests at stake, but it has also 
debilitated the ability of local governments to effectively enforce land 
use regulations against religious institutions. These effects are 
significant and implicate a related concern over the effect and scope 
of RLUIP A in a modem religious society, where the establishment of 
a church is not as simple as it once was. As discussed in the next 
Part, it may be only a matter of time before religious institutions are 
able to secure heightened federal protection for non-religious 
amenities that are only tangentially related to the institution's 
religious, educational, or charitable mission. 162 
IV. THE PROLIFERATION OF MEGA-CHURCHES: A MODERN 
CHALLENGE FOR LOCAL REGULATORS 
The term mega-churches is generally used to refer to any Protestant 
congregation with a sustained average weekly attendance of 2,000 
persons (children and adults) or more in its worship services. 163 
According to studies conducted by the Hartford Seminary and 
Institute for Religious Research, the average mega-church has a 
weekly attendance of 3,857 people. 164 The largest mega-church in the 
United States, Lakewood Church in Houston, Texas, averages 43,500 
in attendance. 165 
Although mega-churches have existed for centuries throughout 
Christian history, 166 cities across the United States have witnessed a 
161. See 146 CONG. REc. S7774, S7780 (2000). There is an inherent contradiction 
between this instruction and a separate section of the legislative history: "This Act 
does not provide religious institutions with immunity from land use regulation .... " 
!d. at S7776. 
162. See Galvan, supra note 44, at 209. 
163. Hartford Seminary, supra note 14. For the purposes of this Comment, this definition 
will be used because it is the defmition used in the research conducted by the Hartford 
Seminary and Institute for Religion Research. !d. This definition is not all-inclusive, 
and there are many-roughly 3000--very large Catholic churches in existence as 
well. !d. 
164. !d. 
165. !d. (go to searchable database and search congregations by size). 
166. ScoTT THUMMA, DAVE TRAVIS & WARREN BIRD, MEGACHURCHES TODAY 2005: 
SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS l (2005) [hereinafter THUMMA, TRAVIS, & BIRD, 
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massive increase in the number and size of mega-churches since the 
1970s.167 In 1970, there were only ten mega-churches nationwide, 168 
but by 2005, the number of mega-churches had jumped to more than 
1,200. 169 According to an eight-year long study published in August 
2008, the growth of mega-churches is likely to continue as churches 
show a steady increase in the number of people they attract. 170 The 
average growth rate for five years was a 50 percent increase in 
attendance. 171 
Although size is the most definitive characteristic of mega-
churches, location is also significant in distinguishing mega-churches 
from the more traditional church model. Most mega-churches are 
located in "suburban areas of rapidly growing sprawl cities such as 
Los Angeles, Dallas, Atlanta, Houston, Orlando, Phoenix and 
Seattle."172 While mega-churches have historically been contained to 
certain geographic areas, studies indicate that mega-churches are 
institutes in transition and are continuously expanding their worship 
and services to new suburban cities. 173 
A. Common Mega-Church Traits 
Mega-churches generally share many traits. For instance, most 
mega-churches have one dominant male pastor, considerable support 
staff, large community congregation, and a significant percentage of 
anonymous spectators. 174 A vast majority of mega-churches share a 
"contemporary worship style," as indicated by the use of "electric 
guitars, keyboards, drums and visual projection equipment."175 Some 
commentators have attributed the immense popularity of mega-
churches to a shared, unique worship style. 176 Congregants prefer 
MEGACHURCHES TODAY], available at http://hirr.hartsem.edu/megachurch/megas 
today2005 _ Summaryreport.html. 
167. Hartford Seminary, supra note 14. 
168. K.ris Axtman, The Rise of the American Megachurch, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Dec. 
30, 2003, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1230/p01s04-ussc.html. 
169. Hartford Seminary, supra note 14. 
170. See SCOTT THUMMA & WARREN BIRD, CHANGES IN AMERICAN MEGACHURCHES: 
TRACING EIGHT YEARS OF GROWTH AND INNOVATION IN THE NATION'S LARGEST-
ATTENDANCE CONGREGATIONS 5 (2008) [hereinafter THUMMA & BIRD, TRACING EIGHT 
YEARS], available at http://hirr.hartsem.edu/megachurch/megastoday2008_Summary 
report.html. 
171. Id 
172. Hartford Seminary, supra note 14. 
173. See THUMMA & BIRD, TRACING EIGHT YEARS, supra note 170, at 2. 
174. Hartford Seminary, supra note 14. 
175. THUMMA & BIRD, TRACING EIGHT YEARS, supra note 170, at 2. 
176. See id. at 2-3, 9-10. 
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mega-churches' innovative use of uplifting songs and motivational 
speeches to traditional religious dogma, rituals, and symbols. 177 
Another notable characteristic among several mega-churches is 
their involvement in American politics. 178 When George W. Bush ran 
for president in 2000, an influential mega-church pastor from Texas, 
Rev. John C. Hagee of Cornerstone Church, made an early 
endorsement that helped him win the much-needed votes of evangelic 
conservatives. 179 In 2006 and 2007 respectively, Senators Barack 
Obama and Hillary Clinton each spoke on separate occasions at Rick 
Warren's Saddleback Church. 180 In 2008, in another forum hosted by 
Rick Warren's Saddleback Church, Senators Barack Obama and John 
McCain both seized the opportunity to obtain additional evangelical 
votes by speaking at the mega-church's high-profile forum. 181 Not 
surprisingly, President Barack Obama even chose mega-church 
Pastor Rick Warren to deliver the invocation at his 2008 inauguration 
ceremony. 182 
B. Non-Religious Amenities of Mega-Churches 
The most notable trait of mega-churches is the number of non-
religious amenities that they offer. Mega-churches are increasingly 
adding non-traditional, non-worship amenities to their list of church 
services in order to attract and keep new congregants. 183 These 
177. Axtman, supra note 168; see also Charles Truehart, Welcome to the Next Church, THE 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug. 1996, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/ 
96aug/nxtchrchlnxtchrch.htm ("Centuries of European tradition and Christian habit 
are deliberately being abandoned, clearing the way for new, contemporary forms of 
worship and belonging."). 
178. See generally Sarah Pulliam, The Megachurch Primaries, 52 CHRISTIANITY TODAY, 
Feb. 2008, at 66-67; Daniel Burke & Cecile S. Holmes, Black Churches Torn 
Between Clinton, Obama, 125 CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Jan. 29, 2008, at 14-15 (stating 
that "the road to the White House in South Carolina runs straight through black 
churches"). 
179. Laurie Goodstein, Spotlight Recasts Church Leaders and Their Support, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 24, 2008, at A12. Numerous political scientists credited Bush's successful 
reelection to the "78 percent of white evangelicals who voted for him, compared to 
the 21 percent who voted for [Senator] John Kerry." Pulliam, supra note 178, at 66. 
180. See Pulliam, supra note 178 at 66-67. Hillary Clinton also employed Pastor Darrell 
Jackson Sr. of the Bible Way Church as a paid consultant as part of her 2008 
presidential campaign. Burke & Holmes, supra note 178, at 14. 
181. Katharine Q. Seelye, Obama Selects California Evangelist for invocation at His 
inauguration, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2008, at A18. 
182. id. 
183. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text. 
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amenities span a wide range of secular activities, 184 prompting some 
observers to refer to the churches as being "full service '24/7' 
sprawling village[s] ... [where] [i]t is possible to eat, shop, go to 
school, bank, work out, scale a rock-climbing wall and pray there, all 
without leaving the grounds."185 Some commentators assert that the 
success of mega-church amenities reflects a cultural shift in 
American religion. 186 If this observation is true, it is relevant to the 
assessment of the likelihood that mega-churches will continue to add 
bigger and better amenities to their repertoire. Already, mega-
churches view every additional location and amenity as an 
investment, literally. 187 
For example, the largest mega-church in the United States, 
Lakewood Church, is one of many mega-churches that continues to 
add amenities in order to increase its visibility, and profitability. 188 In 
2003, Lakewood Church leased the Compaq Center, former home of 
the NBA Houston Rockets, to serve as the worship center for its 
growing congregation. 189 Another prominent mega-church, World 
Changers Ministries, operates a music studio, publishing house, 
computer graphic design suite, and its own record label. 19° For 
Lakewood Church, World Changers Ministries, and similar religious 
institutions, increased locations and amenities are viewed as religious 
in nature and as an opportunity to evangelize. 191 
184. A few examples of prevalent mega-church activities include sports arenas/gyms, 
dining facilities, radio/music stations, shopping centers, credit unions, movie theatres, 
and apartment complexes. See Brown, supra note 16; see also Salkin & Lavine, 
supra note 151, at 224 (citing Diana B. Henriques & Andrew W. Lehren, 
Megachurches Add Local Economy to Mission, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2007, at Al). 
185. Brown, supra note 16. 
186. See id. ("By making it nearly possible to inhabit the church from morning to night, 
cradle to grave, these full-service churches can shelter congregants ... from 'a 
broader society that seems unsafe, unpredictable and out of control, underscored by 
school shootings and terrorism."'). 
187. The average annual income for mega-churches in 2005 was six million dollars. 
THUMMA, DAVIS & BIRD, MEGACHURCHES TODAY, supra note 166, at 4. 
188. Luisa Kroll, Christian Capitalism: Megachurches, Megabusiness, FORBES.COM, Sept. 
17, 2003, available at http://www.forbes.com/2003/09/17 fez _lk _ 0917megachurch_ 
print.html. 
189. !d. The renovations on the stadium cost Lakewood Church ninety-five million dollars 
and included two waterfalls and enough carpeting to cover nine football fields. John 
Leland, A Church that Packs them in, 16,000 at a Time, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2005, at 
Al. The renovated church opened in 2005 to serve a congregation that has revenues 
of over fifty-five million dollars and a television audience of millions. !d. 
190. !d. 
191. See id. Dave Stone, the associate minister of Southeast Christian Church in 
Louisville, Kentucky calls his church a "refueling station," stating "[i]f we can get 
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Quite obviously, the rapid growth of mega-churches has also led to 
an increase in the secondary effects these institutions impose on the 
communities where they are located. 192 Mega-churches are not unlike 
other large-scale institutions which provide the same secular 
amenities, in that they both increase traffic, noise, and sanitation 
issues and diminish available land for other uses. 193 The profound 
and intrusive effect that mega-churches have had on surrounding 
communities has led to an increase in "not-in-my-backyard" 
sentiments among local communities and governments. 194 
Negative responses towards mega-churches have prompted some 
local governments to seek out new was to regulate mega-churches 
and similar institutions to minimize the burdens associated with their 
activities. 195 In spite of these local efforts, RLUIP A provides added 
protections to religious institutions who seek to use the land in ways 
that may run contrary to the values and intentions of local 
communities and governments. 196 Presumably, RLUIP A protects 
some, if not all, of the activities of mega-churches, even if those 
activities run contrary to or interfere with a local government's 
zoning, planning, historical preservation or other generally applicable 
law. This result is and should be of great concern to all communities 
whether or not they are affected by mega-churches, given our 
nation's historical deference to state and local governments in the 
area of land use. 
people to come to our gym ... it's only a matter of time before we can get them to 
visit our sanctuary." Brown, supra note 16. The business of mega-churches is such a 
booming market, that new businesses have been created with the sole purpose of 
helping churches grow. Kroll, supra note 188. One such business, Kingdom 
Ventures, is a publicly traded company whose sole mission is to help faith-based 
organizations get bigger. /d. According to the company, at least 10,000 churches use 
its services. /d. The business of turning churches into corporations has become so 
successful for Kingdom Ventures that it has prompted the company to publish a book, 
which teaches pastors to think like entrepreneurs. /d. Lessons on how to use 
partnerships and marketing events to increase membership are just a few components 
of the mega-church transformation. /d. 
192. See, e.g., Hamilton, Struggling with Churches as Neighbors, supra note 1. 
193. See id. 
194. See id. 
195. See id. 
196. See Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good, supra note 42, at 341 ("Neither the 
tradition of deference [to local land use laws] nor the values behind such deference 
were discussed or even intimated during the recorded oral or written testimony on 
land use and RLPA."). 
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V. LOCAL LAND USE AND THE IMP ACT OF MEGA-
CHURCHES 
[Vol. 39 
A. A Brief History of Land Use Regulation in the United States 
Historically, "[l]and use law has ... been a creature of state and 
local law."197 Land use controls include zoning, subdivision 
regulation, building codes, and growth controls. 198 Zoning is defined 
as the "dividing [of] the land within its corporate limits into 'zones' 
and defining, within each zone, the permitted land uses (such as 
residential, commercial, office, and industrial) and other development 
rights and restrictions (such as height and density)."199 
Government regulation of land use can be traced back to colonial 
America and earlier.200 The colonists treated land as a community 
resource and imposed restrictions on private property in order to 
serve the public interest. 201 Several laws "restricted the location of 
dwellings, imposed affirmative obligations of use, compelled the 
fencing of agricultural land, required owners of wetlands to share the 
cost of drainage projects, and allowed the public to hunt on private 
land."202 Although substantively distinguishable, these laws resemble 
modem zoning regulations in that both are enacted by local 
governments and restrain a private individuals' use of land in order to 
extract greater positive benefits for the community as a whole. 203 
197. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good, supra note 42. See, e.g., Village of 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386, 390-95 (1926) (upholding a local 
zoning ordinance, excluding apartment houses, business houses, retail stores, and 
shops from residential districts) ("Building zone laws are of modern origin. They 
began in this country about 25 years ago."); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 
U.S. 590, 596 (1962) (upholding a local zoning ordinance as a valid exercise of state 
police power); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 768 n.30 (1982) ("[The] regulation 
ofland use is perhaps the quintessential state activity."). 
198. Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer & Thomas E. Roberts, LAND UsE PLANNING AND 
DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 46 (2d ed. 2007). 
199. Matthew E. Norton, Land Use and Development, 558 PLI: REAL EsT. L. & PRAc. 999, 
1003 (2008). 
200. Juergensmeyer & Roberts, supra note 198, at 43. 
201. /d. at 43-44. For example, a 1632 Cambridge, Massachusetts ordinance included the 
following provisions: "[N]o buildings could be built in outlying areas until vacant 
spaces within the town were developed. Roofs had to be covered with slate or board 
rather than thatch. Heights of all buildings had to be the same. Lots were forfeited if 
not built on in six months. Finally, buildings could only be erected with the consent 
of the mayor." /d. at 44. 
202. /d. 
203. See id. at 43-44; see also John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the 
Original Meaning of the Takings Clause, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 1099, 1030-31 (2000) 
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Eventually, the doctrine of nuisance law gave rise to the first 
zoning regulations imposed by local governments in large cities.204 
The common law classifications, such as public, private, nuisances 
per se, or nuisances in fact, embody basic concepts of reasonable use 
and afford an individual landowner remedies for any unreasonable 
interferences with the use and enjoyment of his or her land. 205 In 
general, nuisance law weighs the gravity of the harm to the plaintiff 
against the utility of the defendant's use.206 
In 1916, New York City implemented the nation's first 
comprehensive zoning ordinance using basic concepts of nuisance 
law.207 The success ofNew York City's zoning ordinance, combined 
with the need to regulate land use, prompted large cities across the 
nation to enact zoning ordinances similar to New York. 208 The 
immense popularity of zoning also led to the release of the Standard 
State Zoning Enabling Act in 1924 under the Herbert Hoover 
Administration.209 The Standard Act became the model for land use 
regulations nationwide and eventually all fifty states adopted 
enabling acts patterned on the Standard Act. 210 
In 1926, the Supreme Court handed down a seminal land use 
decision that upheld as constitutional the practice of zoning. In 
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,211 the Court confirmed that it 
is a vested right of local governments to enact land use regulations to 
protect the "public health, safety, morals, or general welfare" of 
communities.212 The Court considered local restrictions on land use 
(explaining how land use laws emphasized serving the community from as far back as 
1776). 
204. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW§ 1.04 (5th ed. 2003). 
205. Juergensmeyer & Roberts, supra note 198, at 621. 
206. See id. at 623. 
207. MANDELKER, supra note 204, § 1.01. The New York legislature and courts 
understood the importance of regulating nuisances in fact, or activities and operations 
that constitute a nuisance only because of location, surroundings, or manner of 
operation. See id. 
208. See Juergensmeyer & Roberts, supra note 198, at 23. 
209. Jd. at47. 
210. MANDELKER, supra note 204, § 1.01. 
211. 272 u.s. 365 (1926). 
212. Jd. at 392, 395 (upholding the general validity of an ordinance that set use, height, and 
bulk restrictions for an entire town). By the time the Court upheld the practice of 
zoning as constitutional, approximately 564 cities and towns had enacted 
comprehensive zoning regulations similar to the regulations sustained in Euclid. 
Juergensmeyer & Roberts, supra note 198, at 44. 
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as necessary and as a valid means for local governments to meet the 
complex and constantly developing conditions of society. 213 
Following Euclid, the Court consistently affirmed the inherent right 
of local governments to regulate land use, later adding that the 
authority to develop and implement regulations is expansive.214 For 
example, in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,215 the Court held that 
the power of local governments is "not confined to elimination of 
filth, stench, and unhealthy places," but rather, "[i]t is ample to lay 
out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of 
quiet seclusion and clear air make the area a sanctuary for people."216 
The fundamental principle of zoning, or "Euclidean zoning" as it 
has been commonly referred to after Euclid, is that "everything has 
its place."217 Based on this theory, local governments develop 
comprehensive zoning regulations that relegate each land use to its 
proper place and place limitations on certain types ofland use.218 The 
purposes of zoning often include, but are not limited to: preservation 
of property values, preservation of character, traffic safety, public 
health, regulation of business competition, economic planning, and 
promotion of morals. 219 
Moreover, a single zoning regulation may serve several purposes, 
and the purposes often overlap with one another. 220 The distinctions 
between different zoning regulations often reflect the unique 
differences in the type of land that the regulation is meant to address 
or the needs of the community where the regulation is enforced. 221 In 
fact, in Euclid, the Supreme Court recognized that variations in land 
use regulations were legitimate, if not inherent, when it stated that, 
"[a] regulatory zoning ordinance, which would be clearly valid as 
213. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 386-87 ("Such regulations are sustained, under the complex 
conditions of our day, for reasons analogous to those which justify traffic regulations, 
which, before the advent of automobiles and rapid transit street railways, would have 
been condemned as fatally arbitrary and unreasonable."). 
214. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 5, 9 (1974); Rapanos v. United 
States, 547 U.S. 715, 737-38 (2006). 
215. 416 U.S. l. 
216. !d. at 9 (upholding a local zoning ordinance, which limited the occupancy of one-
family dwellings to traditional families or to groups of not more than two unrelated 
persons). 
21 7. Juergensmeyer & Roberts, supra note 198, at 69. This type of zoning is said to be 
Euclidean "in two senses-the kind of zoning adopted was similar to that used in the 
Village of Euclid-and the landscape was divided into a geometric pattern of use 
districts." !d. at 44-45. 
218. See id. at 53-91. 
219. See id. 
220. /d. at 54. 
221. See Salkin & Lavine, supra note 151, at 215. 
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applied to the great cities, might be clearly invalid as applied to rural 
communities."222 Based on this rationale, it would not be surprising 
to find that zoning regulations across the nation would vary greatly 
from one another. 223 However, RLUIP A does not address, nor does it 
incorporate the critical differences in the land that it regulates. 
B. The Intersection of Religious Conduct and Land Use Regulation 
The history of land use regulation in the United States underlies the 
substantial value of zoning to local governments and communities. 
Zoning is a means for local governments' to govern the use of its 
land and the development of its community, and how a local 
government chooses to incorporate religious land use into its zoning 
regulation has been and continues to be particularly important. When 
land use regulations were first imposed, local governments viewed 
religious land uses as "inherently beneficial," and communities 
encouraged the presence of churches and synagogues in residential 
neighborhoods because they provided the neighborhood with a 
positive "moral tone" and served as a center of community activity. 224 
Neighbors also favored local churches and synagogues because they 
typically served those living nearby.225 Overall, communities did not 
view them as intruding upon the neighborhood and regulators did not 
view them as disturbing the overall land use scheme. 226 
Over time, however, this positive perception of religious 
institutions and religious land use has been replaced by a more 
negative, skeptical perception.227 Local communities and regulators 
no longer view religious institutions preferentially, but they are 
increasingly concerned about the adverse effects of religious land 
use.228 As a natural result of this shift, friction between religious 
institutions and local zoning regulations has steadily increased.229 
222. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). 
223. The nuances that differentiate zoning regulations in the many state and local 
jurisdictions across the United States is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
224. Juergensmeyer & Roberts, supra note 198 at 486. Local communities rarely tried to 
exclude religious uses from residential areas. /d. In the few cases where a city tried 
to exclude a religious institution from a neighborhood, the courts usually held that 
such exclusions were arbitrary. Jd. (citing State ex rei. Lake Drive Baptist Church v. 
Village of Bayside Bd. ofTrustees, 108 N.W.2d 288, 300 (Wis. 1961)). 
225. Juergensmeyer & Roberts, supra note 198, at 486. 
226. Jd. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. at 486-87. 
229. See id. at 487. 
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The rise in mega-churches exacerbates this friction because it 
presents new and distinct challenges for local regulators. 230 A mega-
church functions as "the religious version of the gated community."231 
Not only must local regulators find ways to adapt their regulatory 
frameworks to address the size and volume of the amenities of mega-
churches, but regulators must also balance the competing interests of 
mega-churches against those of the community. 232 Local 
governments continually seek to balance these two interests through 
regulations that harmonize mega-church land use and ameliorate the 
negative secondary effects that mega-churches impose.233 
As a result, religious institutions now sometimes face more 
stringent requirements on their land use. 234 In some cases, this simply 
means that local governments are treating religious institutions 
similar to secular institutions that produce the same noise, parking, 
and traffic problems. 235 In other cases, it means that local 
governments are treating religious institutions more harsh because of 
the "intensity of use" of the institution and because of the disharmony 
that its land use breeds in the community. 236 In the communities 
where local governments have increased regulation, regulators 
continue to clash with mega-churches over regulations that apply to 
an institution's activities that extend beyond traditional church 
functions, such as homeless shelters, soup kitchens, senior or child 
day care centers, and schools. 237 This increased conflict has, in tum, 
generated additional free exercise challenges. 238 
Of the additional challenges raised, many are coupled with or 
proceed solely upon RLUIPA. 239 This is problematic for local 
governments seeking to regulate religious land use because RLUIP A 
230. See supra Part IV.B. 
231. Brown, supra note 16, at F6 (quoting Dr. Wade Clark Roof, a professor of religion 
and society at the University of California at Santa Barbara). 
232. See Juergensmeyer & Roberts, supra note 198, at 467-68; see also Hamilton, 
Federalism and the Public Good, supra note 42, at 338 (emphasizing the complexities 
ofland use law and that each jurisdiction attempts to "find the right mix of factors to 
maximize optimal and harmonious use"). 
233. See Juergensmeyer & Roberts supra note 198, at 467-68. 
234. See id.; see also Federalism and the Public Good, supra note 42, at 338-39 (noting 
that different jurisdictions use a variety of restrictions and accommodations when 
addressing religious land use). 
235. See Juergensmeyer & Roberts, supra note 198, at 486. 
236. See id. 
237. Hamilton, Struggling with Churches as Neighbors, supra note l. 
238. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 1, at 2-3 (listing types ofRLUlPA claims). 
239. Juergensmeyer & Roberts, supra note 198, at 489. 
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tends to resolve land use disputes in favor of religious institutions. 240 
When invoked by a religious institution, RLUIP A severely undercuts 
the authority of local governments. 
First, the broad protection RLUIP A provides to religious 
institutions limits the inherent power of local governments to regulate 
land use, regardless of the religious institution's location or size, and 
even when the burdens associated with the religious land use are 
identical to other, regulated land uses. 241 The federal statute's 
curtailment of a constitutionally recognized power of local 
governments has reinvigorated the federalism objections that once 
prevailed against RFRA.242 Because local land use regulation is "a 
means [for] individual communities to shape their goals, and [i]s a 
means [for] experimentation in achieving the elusive public good," it 
has been said to embody the core "value of federalism. "243 On the 
other hand, RLUIPA undermines this principle. Federal regulation of 
land use simply does not adequately account for community input 
and does not ensure accountability on the part of those responsible 
for enforcing regulations at the locallevel.244 
RLUIP A also limits the plenary authority of state and local 
governments to regulate religious issues in the area between the Free 
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment.245 For the most part, the resolution of religious issues 
has traditionally been reserved exclusively to the states, free from 
240. See supra notes 44, 130 and Part 111.8; see also infra notes 268-69. 
241. See supra notes 44, 130 and Part III.B; see also infra Part V.C. 
242. See, e.g., Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good, supra note 42, at 320-26, 332-
33 (explaining the federalism debate in relation to RFRA); see also infra notes 275-
79 and accompanying text. 
243. !d. at 337. 
244. See Schragger, supra note 44, at 1849-50 ("In the context of religious exemptions, 
those values often invoked in support of a sphere of state autonomy-local control, 
accountability, experimentation, interjurisdictional competition, and diffusion of 
political power-are more applicable to local government."); see also infra notes 263 
(discussing the expectation of citizens that land use decisions will be made by locally 
elected officials) and 283 (discussing how citizen access to public officials 
responsible for dealing with local problems promotes democracy). 
245. See Brieffor Respondents at 25-28, Cutter v. Wilkinson, 423 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(No. 03-9877), 2005 WL 363713; see also Matthew Gaus, Note, Locke v. Davey: 
Discretion, Discrimination, and the New Free Exercise, 54 U. KAN. L. REv. 553, 584-
85 (2006) ("[B]y creating the zone of discretion in the religious clauses, the Locke [ v. 
Davey] court gave at least implied legitimacy to the notion that, within certain limits, 
the federal government is not authorized to interfere with state religious policy."). 
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federal interference or limitation.246 State and local governments 
have been free to resolve religious issues that fall between the Free 
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause because they are in the 
best position to balance the competing mandates of the two 
Clauses.247 In the land use context, the freedom of local regulators to 
regulate land use issues allows each locality to develop nuanced and 
tailored regulation frameworks that neither favor religion nor impose 
a substantial burden on the exercise of religion. 248 
Finally, RLUIP A unnecessarily preempts the free exercise 
exemptions already in place at the state and local level. 249 Before the 
enactment of RLUIP A, a significant number of states had taken steps 
to protect against government violations of free exercise rights by 
enforcing flexible and fair regulations tailored to their land. 250 In 
fact, state and local governments have evidenced a continued interest 
in strengthening the free exercise rights of individuals and institutions 
by enacting additional free exercise protections after the Supreme 
Court's decisions in Smith251 and City of Boerne.252 RLUIPA limits 
246. See generally William H. Hurd & William E. Thro, The Federalism Aspect of the 
Establishment Clause, ENGAGE: THE J. OF THE FEDERALIST Soc'v PRAC. GROUPS, Oct. 
2004 at 62 ("[I]n the zone between what the Establishment Clause prohibits and what 
the Free Exercise Clause requires, the National Government must allow the States to 
make their own policy choices."); see also 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES§ 1873 at 731 (1833) ("[T)he whole power over 
the subject of religion is left exclusively to the state governments, to be acted upon 
according to their own sense of justice, and the state constitutions .... "). 
247. See Hurd & Thro, supra note 246, at 65 (arguing that when the federal government 
interferes with states' prerogative to make religious policy decisions, the federal 
government violates the Establishment Clause). 
248. See Schragger, supra note 44, at 1825 ("[T]he Religion Clauses, as originally 
conceived, had a diversity-protecting function: they served to protect local approaches 
to religious liberty then extant in the states."); see also Hurd & Thro, supra note 246, 
at 65 (arguing that although RLUIPA favors religious accommodation, it "interfere[s] 
with State sovereignty no less than if Congress had prohibited such 
accommodation."). 
249. See Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good, supra note 42, at 335-38; McCusker, 
supra note 77, at 395 n.25 (providing examples of state free exercise exemptions). 
250. Juergensmeyer & Roberts, supra note 198, at 495. For example, Illinois amended its 
state RFRA to accommodate religion without interfering with the expansion of 
Chicago's O'Hare airport, a vital component of the Chicago area. See Salkin & 
Lavine, supra note 151, at 258 (citing St. John's United Church of Christ v. City of 
Chicago, 502 F.3d 616,634-35 (7th Cir. 2007)). 
251. See generally Alan E. Brownstein, State RFRA Statutes and Freedom of Speech, 32 
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 605, 607 & n.4, 608 (1999) (discussing state religious freedom 
restoration acts). 
252. See Karen L. Antos, Note, A Higher Authority: How the Federal Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act Affects State Control Over Religious Land Use 
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the force of state and local religious land use exemptions because its 
provisions apply more broadly and religious institutions often invoke 
its protections.253 
C. The Inadequacies of RL UIP A 
Although RLUIP A provides a broader swath of free exercise 
protections, it ineffectively and unfairly resolves land use conflicts 
between religious individuals and institutions and local 
governments.254 Federal legislation is impractical in application and 
unconstitutional, because it lacks narrow tailoring to individual 
communities, discourages religious diversity, favors majority 
religions, and intimates government favoring ofreligion.255 
1. Federal Legislation Lacks Narrow Tailoring 
As discussed throughout this Comment, a significant benefit 
derived from local land use regulation is that it results in balanced 
and fair regulations appropriately geared towards the land being 
regulated. Conversely, federal legislation applies the same standard 
to every geographic region, and every local community, government, 
and religious institution. Uniform standards, like the one embodied 
in RLUIP A, are ineffective because they lack the narrow tailoring of 
local legislation, which reflects the "different values, different 
dominant land uses, and different state constitutional treatment for 
religious entities" that is inherent in fifty diverse jurisdictions.256 
Local legislation is quite obviously preferred over federal 
legislation because local legislation is the product of individual 
negotiations between members of a community-religious and 
secular-and the government. 257 In essence, local laws are 
compromises; local laws are an agreed upon apportioning of benefits 
and burdens within a community. Each state or local government 
must accept some of the effects of religious land use on the 
Conflicts, 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 557, 567 & n.81 (2008). At least eleven states 
reinstated the strict scrutiny standard after City of Boerne. !d. 
253. See supra notes 1, 5; see also infra notes 268-69. 
254. See Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good, supra note 42, at 335-38. 
255. See id. 
256. !d. at 338. 
257. See Schragger, supra note 44, at 1848 (discussing the importance oflocal negotiations 
as a forum for local communities to deal with religious conflict collectively); see also 
Mark Spykerman, Note, When God and Costco Battle for a City's Soul: Can the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act Fairly Acljudicate Both Sides in 
Land Use Disputes?, 18 WASH. U. J.L. &PoL'Y 291,309 (2005). 
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community and each religious institution must accept some 
limitations on their conduct.258 Federal legislation simply cannot 
strike the same balance. 
2. Federal Legislation Discourages Religious Diversity 
The negative effects of the disconnectedness of federal legislation 
also have greater ramifications in that it may actually discourage the 
successful integration of religion. As discussed in Part III of this 
Comment/59 RLUIP A overwhelmingly favors religious land use. In 
addition, RLUIP A further hedges the interests of religious institutions 
and local communities by creating an incentive for religious 
institutions to pursue litigation rather than work with a local 
community or government to develop fair religious land use 
accommodations. 260 This knee-jerk resort to litigation261 deprives 
local regulators of the opportunity to attempt to integrate religious 
land use into reasonable and balanced regulations and it completely 
disrupts a community's overall ability to pursue land use regulations 
consistent with its own religious policies. 
This substantial favoring of religious land use also poses the 
unanticipated concern that RLUIP A will generate nationwide 
resentment towards religion. 262 Some commentators have predicted 
that RLUIP A and similar far-reaching legislation will provoke 
negative reactions among communities due to its effect of trumping 
local policies and norms. 263 RLUIP A increases the distinct possibility 
that communities will become hostile towards unfamiliar religious 
institutions and instinctively recoil from religious diversity in general 
258. See Schragger, supra note 44, at 1818-20, 1848 ("Instead of a single standard of 
review for all government actions that touch on religion, the Court should embrace a 
nuanced approach, one that is attentive to the institutional location of any particular 
religion-burdening or -benefiting activity."). 
259 . See supra Part III.B-C. 
260. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 11 (comparing RLUIPA to RFRA and noting that 
while RFRA "did not produce a large number of challenges to land-use regulation of 
religious uses," RLUIPA "has resulted in a flurry of threatened, and actual, 
litigation"). 
261. See supra notes I, 5 (addressing the prevalence of RLUIPA litigation across the 
nation); see also infra note 269 (discussing the negative effects ofRLUIPA litigation). 
262. See Schragger, supra note 44, at 1847. 
263. See id.; see also Lora A. Lucero, The Evolving RLUIPA Landscape, 26 No. 10 
ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 1 (2005) (indicating the expectation of most citizens that land 
use, growth, and development decisions will continue to be made by the elected and 
appointed officials of their cities). 
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because of the perceived preferential treatment of religious 
institutions. 264 
3. Federal Legislation Favors Majority Religions 
RLUIP A's failure to effectively integrate religion into communities 
is doubly problematic because it also is not equipped to achieve its 
primary purpose of protecting discreet and minority religious 
institutions. These groups, while usually marginalized by federal 
legislation, are able to more successfully influence religious 
accommodations in a local forum?65 Federal legislation is geared 
towards large, organized religious organizations that have the 
resources and support to reach across state and local borders and 
exercise power in Congress.266 With RLUIP A, Congress has all but 
guaranteed that grassroots, minority, and financially weak religious 
groups no longer have a voice in the dialogue on future religious 
accommodations in the land use context. 
4. Federal Legislation Intimates Government Favoring of Religion 
The disproportionate land use benefit that RLUIP A provides to 
religious institutions, particularly majority institutions, implicates 
another drawback of federal legislation when it comes to drafting 
religious accommodations. To add to the Establishment Clause 
concerns discussed in Part III of this Comment/67 is the concern that 
local governments will overreact to RLUIP A and go farther than 
necessary to protect religious land use to avoid the costs associated 
with RLUIP A litigation. 268 This trend has already been documented 
264. See Schragger, supra note 44, at 1847; Hamilton, Struggling with Churches as 
Neighbors, supra note 1. This argument is buttressed by the fact that Congress failed 
to adequately take into account the interests of municipalities and states, both of 
whom were strongly opposed to the statute's passage. ld. 
265. See Schragger, supra note 44, at 1870 (citations omitted) (noting that in the context of 
federal funding, large, national secular and religious nonprofit organizations have 
received favorable treatment, while minority, grassroots organizations have been 
marginalized). 
266. See Schragger, supra note 44, at 1845; see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit 
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 576 n.l8 (5-4 decision) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[W]e have 
witnessed in recent years the rise of numerous special interest groups that engage in 
sophisticated lobbying, and make substantial campaign contributions to some 
Members of Congress. These groups are thought to have significant influence in the 
shaping and enactment of certain types of legislation."). 
267. See supra Part III.B-C. 
268. See Galvan, supra note 44, at 231 (stating that "religious institutions have realized 
that land use authorities are extremely vulnerable to the threat of litigation"); see also 
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in the many cases that have become public, in which local 
governments showed a tendency to acquiesce to religious institutions 
in order to avoid the time, expense, and social cost of continued 
litigation. 269 
To the extent that RLUIPA trumps local regulations and local 
governments acquiesce to religious institutions, RLUIP A could come 
to mean that the amenities of institutions like mega-churches will be 
are fully protected. 270 To be sure, imposing the highest constitutional 
standard to review local regulations will most likely result in land use 
·triumphs for religious institutions, all but immunizing religious land 
use against generally applicable regulations. Although it may not 
have played out in full yet, the eventual and probable long-term 
effects of RLUIP A are enough to warrant a discussion of potential 
alternative solutions to protecting the free exercise of religion in the 
land use context. 
VI. RETURNING LAND USE REGULATION TO STATE AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
Although in the nine years since RLUIP A came into effect 
commentators have discussed the statute's value at length, the 
discourse has yielded several proposed solutions that arguably fall 
short in terms of their focus on federal legislation as the appropriate 
medium for crafting religious accommodations. The purpose of this 
Comment is not to address every solution or to critique any one 
solution in particular, but to advance a solution that remedies the 
flawed assumption underlying RLUIP A, and to provide a sustainable 
framework for resolving land use conflicts in a rapidly evolving 
modem religious society. 271 
As discussed in Part V of this Comment, 272 religious 
accommodations in the land use context are unnecessarily broad and 
general at the federal level. A workable solution, however, would be 
to return land use regulation to state and local governments. Our 
nation is entrenched in a deep history of deferring to state and local 
governments to regulate land use because local regulation embodies 
Weinstein, supra note 1, at 3 (noting that local government reactions range, 
sometimes being "immediate unconditional surrender at a church's mere mention of 
RLUIPA"). 
269. See Galvan, supra note 44, at 231 (citing examples in Denver, Colorado and 
Rockaway Township, New Jersey to illustrate the power of RLUIP A outside the 
courts to shelter auxiliary uses from land use regulations). 
270. See id. 
271. See supra notes 177, 186. 
272. See supra Part V.C. 
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core federalism principles and because state and local governments 
are in the optimum position to draft and implement land use 
regulations that balance all of the interests at stake in a land use 
dispute. The need for balanced land use regulations will likely be 
increasingly relevant for all parties involved in land use disputes, as 
local governments confront the development of mega-churches and 
other unanticipated religious land use issues. 
A. The Traditional Regulatory Authority of State and Local 
Governments 
Returning land use regulation to the local level is consonant with 
this nation's practice of relegating certain powers and responsibilities 
to the various state and local governments. 273 Local governments 
have historically shaped the contours of land use law for several 
reasons. First, land use regulations are inherently tied to the 
characteristics of the land, which is unique and relevant only to those 
who live in the area.274 Local governments are in the best position to 
understand and address the subtle distinctions of the land being 
regulated and those in the community seeking to use the land. 275 
Second, deference to local land use regulation and religious policy 
is consistent with core federalism principles.276 Regulating how land 
is used in each state is a significant component of a state's police 
power, and the interest of each state in regulating land use without 
undue interference by Congress is best protected by ensuring state 
and local sovereignty.277 The power oflocal governments to regulate 
land use is implicated whether the land use is religious or secular in 
nature, and arguably to a greater extent in cases involving religious 
land use because of the unique interests at stake. 278 Land use 
conflicts involving religious issues present new and developing 
273. See supra Part V.A. 
274. See supra Part V.A. 
275. See supra Part V.A. 
276. See supra notes 240-22 and accompanying text. 
277. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-51 (1985) 
(discussing the structure of federalism and proposing that the government was 
"designed in large part to protect the States from overreaching by Congress"); see also 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 660-61 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(noting the framers' structural design of the legislative process to protect states from 
infringement); THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 332 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher 
Wright ed., 1961) (explaining that the federal government "will partake sufficiently of 
the spirit [.:Jfthe States], to be disinclined to invade the rights of the individual States, 
or the prerogatives of their governments"). 
278. See supra Part IV. 
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challenges for local governments279 and established federalism 
principles provide the requisite room for local regulators to 
experiment with innovative and flexible regulations that neither 
provide too great nor too little religious protection.280 
This balanced approach is particularly significant in our modem 
religious society. As mega-churches seek to expand into new and 
unfamiliar neighborhoods, local governments must retain broad 
authority to categorically regulate land use that is not inherently 
religious and which implicates the same concerns as other, secular 
land use.281 The Supreme Court ascribes to the notion that land use 
regulation is a means for urban and rural communities to achieve "a 
satisfactory quality of life," which translated into meaningful terms 
today, suggests that local governments must be afforded great latitude 
to regulate the amenities of mega-churches. 282 
B. A Balanced Approach to Accommodating Religious Land Use 
In addition, local land use regulation results in more balanced land 
use accommodations. At the local level, religious institutions, local 
communities, and governments frequently interact and communicate 
with one another. Because local citizens have the most direct access 
to government officials responsible for creating and implementing 
land use laws, this discourse will result in more responsive, fair 
regulations. 283 Continued discourse at the local level will encourage, 
rather than discourage religious diversity, and even counteract the 
current, demonstrated negative perception that some people have of 
religious institutions.284 
279. See supra Part IV.B. 
280. See San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. at 567 n.13 (5-4 decision) (Powell, J., 
dissenting); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) ("There must be power in the states and the nation to remould [sic], 
through experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet changing 
social and economic needs."); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 351-52 (James 
Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); Steven D. Smith, Blooming Confusion: 
Madison's Mixed Legacy, 75 IND. L. J. 61,70 (2000)(explaining Madison's belief 
that federalism was an institutional structure "in which pluralism can flourish"). 
281. See supra notes 192-94. 
282. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981). 
283. See San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. at 576 n.18 (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that "[t]he Framers recognized that the most effective democracy occurs at 
local levels of government, where people with firsthand knowledge of local problems 
have more ready access to public officials responsible for dealing with them"); see 
also THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 107 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at316 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
284. See Schragger, supra note 44, at 1847-48. 
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Local land use regulation also ensures greater compliance with the 
mandates of the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause 
of the First Amendment. The invalidation of RLUIP A would 
significantly minimize the risk that religious institutions would 
immediately resort to litigation, and that local governments would 
overact to religious land use disputes in favor of religious institutions. 
The same time, expense, and social costs associated with fighting a 
RLUIP A land use claim would simply no longer exist. In lieu of 
litigation, religious institutions would be encouraged to work with 
state and local governments, who could once again focus their time 
and energy on accommodating religious land use in a balanced 
manner.285 
Moreover, local land use regulation minimizes Establishment 
Clause concerns because local governments would be free to 
differentiate between those accessory uses that are religious in nature 
and those that are only tangentially related to the mission of a 
religious institution. Categorical distinctions between the two uses 
are subtle, and thus are best recognized by local regulators familiar 
with the land at issue and the religious institution operating in the 
community.286 Individualized land use regulations will likely become 
more important as religious institutions continue to diversify the 
activities and amenities that they offer. While it is impossible to 
predict the religious land use issues that will develop in the future, it 
is important to advocate a solution where state and local regulators 
are free to resolve them without undue federal oversight or 
interference. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The recent debate over land use has set the stage for the Supreme 
Court to once again invalidate an effort by Congress to regulate an 
area that is reserved to state and local governments. The Supreme 
Court has consistently recognized that the regulation of land use is an 
inherent and primary right of local governments, and moreover, that 
it is a critical component of a community's ability to set priorities, 
establish character, and meet societal needs. 
When Congress passed RLUIP A, it overstepped constitutional 
bounds and unnecessarily constrained the inherent regulatory 
285. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) ("[T]here is room for play in the 
joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to 
exist without sponsorship and without interference."). 
286. See supra Part V.A. 
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authority of the state and local governments that face innumerable 
challenges associated with religious land use in a modern religious 
society. The proliferation of mega-churches distinctively illustrates 
the need for state and local governments to retain the right to regulate 
land use broadly, unrestrained by RLUIPA or other similar far-
reaching federal legislation. Mega-churches are larger, more 
intrusive, and retain greater abilities to influence religious 
accommodations than their predecessors. Most significantly, mega-
churches often operate amenities that are not inherently religious in 
nature and that occupy a great deal of land. With the repeal of 
RLUIP A, state and local governments will be free to once again 
experiment with innovative and flexible land use regulations that 
serve their communities' needs and desires, and that reflect all of the 
unique interests at stake in land use disputes. 
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